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DRED SCOTT: TIERED CITIZENSHIP AND TIERED PERSONHOOD
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Dred Scott v. Sandford' is one of the most troubling opinions ever issued by the United States Supreme Court. 2 Though its deficiencies are
legion, the particular problem this brief essay focuses on is the opinion's
acceptance and perpetuation of the notion that America affords multiple
tiers of citizenship and multiple tiers of personhood. The tiered citizenship
that Dred Scott accepted suggests that denying certain citizenship rights to
specific groups of citizens is acceptable. Similarly, the tiered personhood
that Dred Scott allowed suggests that rights ostensibly owed to all people
by virtue of their personhood are not owed to certain groups of people.
Rather than attempt to justify the differential treatment between groups of
citizens and between groups of people, the Dred Scott opinion simply noted
the differential treatment and accepted it. For these reasons alone, Chief
Justice Taney's majority opinion deserves the opprobrium that has been
3
heaped upon it.
The twin ills of tiered citizenship and tiered personhood were largely
eliminated, in theory and eventually in practice, by the Reconstruction
Amendments-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. Through their language and subsequent interpretation, those amendments introduced a formal equality that created a single
* The author extends a special thank you to Dr. Spencer Crew, Director, National Underground
Railroad Freedom Center, who commented on this paper at the Dred Scott Symposium at the University
of Texas School of Law and to all of the participants at the symposium who provided comments on this
paper. In addition I thank my family for their support and the University of Richmond Law School for
the financial support of this project.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. It was also a catalyst in causing untold pain. See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V.
SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 2 (1997) ("it would be an exaggeration to say that the
Dred Scott decision caused the Civil War. But it certainly pushed the nation far closer to that war.").
3. References to Dred Scott or the Dred Scott opinion are to Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's
opinion. Though great debate remains regarding the issues on which Taney's opinion should be deemed
authoritative, Taney's opinion has become the Dred Scott opinion such that the ideas found in it can be
called the ideas of the Dred Scott Court. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE INAMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 337 (1978) ("And yet the Taney opinion is, for all
practical purposes, the Dred Scott decision and therefore a historical document of prime importance.").

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 82:209

tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood by requiring that citizenship rights be provided equally to citizens and rights of personhood be provided to all people under U.S. jurisdiction. Certainly, under certain
conditions, some citizens may be stripped of citizenship rights and some
persons may be denied certain rights of life, liberty, or property. When a
denial of rights is properly justified, the denial does no violence to the notion of a single tier of citizenship or a single tier of personhood. Conversely, when there is no proper justification for stripping such rights, such
treatment may create tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood.
Part I of this brief essay discusses Dred Scott and the Court's acceptance of tiered citizenship and tiered personhood. Part II discusses the Reconstruction Amendments as a response to tiered citizenship and tiered
personhood. Part III notes two issues-felon disfranchisement and the
treatment of detainees in the War on Terror-that help illuminate tiered
citizenship and tiered personhood and help us evaluate the conditions under
which citizenship and personhood rights may be restricted without creating
4
tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood.
I.

DRED SCoTT's TAXONOMY OF CITIZENSHIP AND PERSONHOOD

Though the facts of Dred Scott v. Sandford are known to most, its
most basic facts bear repeating. In the case, plaintiff Dred Scott claimed
that he became a free man during his travels with his master through Illinois, a free state, and Fort Snelling in the Wisconsin territory, near moderday St. Paul, Minnesota, where slavery had been banned by the Missouri
Compromise. 5 If Scott were a free man, neither he nor his family, whose
cases had been consolidated with his, could be held in servitude. However,
intertwined with the issue of Scott's freedom was whether Scott could sue
in federal court. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney, decided, in ruling against Scott, that Scott was not and
could not be a citizen of Missouri for the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction that was necessary to allow the federal courts to hear Scott's case. 6
4. Of course, this brief essay is meant merely to raise issues rather than resolve them and is not
intended to be a full treatment of any of the issues raised herein. For a fuller treatment of some of the
issues raised, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002) [hereinafter Chambers, Colorblindness]; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Retooling
the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 611
(2004) [hereinafter Chambers, Retooling].
5. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 431-32; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 244;
FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
6. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454 ("[T]he plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri,
in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United
States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it."). In addition,
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Though that ruling arguably resolved the case, Taney analyzed Scott's
substantive claim to freedom and rejected it, leaving Scott and his family
7
enslaved.
The Court's ruling, that Scott was not a citizen, was not particularly
shocking. However, the language Chief Justice Taney used to discuss
Scott's citizenship and personhood, or lack thereof, is breathtaking. Taney
indicated not only that Scott was not a citizen, but also declared that under
no circumstances could Scott or any black person-whether born free,
formerly enslaved, or then still enslaved-be a citizen of the United States
under the Constitution and laws as they then stood.8 Taney not only noted
that Scott was not a citizen of the United States, but that even if Scott had
been a free black person, he might not have been entitled to the rights that
other non-U.S. citizen residents in the United States could exercise. 9 The
structure of Taney's argument, with its clear delineations that treated some
groups of citizens differently than other groups of citizens and that treated
some groups of persons differently than other groups of persons, recognized and tacitly endorsed tiered citizenship and tiered personhood.
A.

Citizenship

Before deciding whether Dred Scott was a citizen of a state and of the
United States, Chief Justice Taney had to determine what a citizen is. The
Dred Scott Court's vision of who was a citizen was simple. Citizens were
members of the sovereign people for whom the Republic was founded and
by whom the Republic was run (through their representatives).' 0 The re-

the Court ruled the Missouri Compromise invalid to the extent that it banned slavery in the Upper
Louisiana territory, though that issue is not a core concern of this essay. See id. at 432-52.
7. See id. at 452 ("[T]he act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning
property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his
family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the
owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.").
8. See id. at 404 ("We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to
be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.").
9. See id. at 403-04 (noting that Indians retained the possibility of becoming citizens while black
persons did not).
10. See id. at 404 ("The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms,
and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.").
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mainder of Taney's discussion of Dred Scott's claims of citizenship flowed
from this understanding of citizenship.l"
The citizens of the several states at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution became citizens of the United States and no one else. 12 Those
descended from that group of people also became citizens of the United
States, as it was for the posterity of the citizens of the several states that the
states created the United States.13 Those not descended from the original
citizens of the United States had to become citizens of the United States
through other birthright means or through naturalization controlled by the
federal government. 14 Upon ratification of the Constitution, the right to
create U.S. citizens was given solely to the federal government. 15 States
retained the right to create state citizens who could exercise state citizenship rights. 16 However, states lost the ability to create state citizens who
would automatically become U.S. citizens and could exercise the rights of
U.S. citizenship, including the right to enjoy the rights and immunities of
the citizens of other states when traveling in those other states. 17
Given its vision of citizen creation, the Dred Scott Court had to examine how slaves and their descendants were regarded at the time the United
States was created to determine if any had been citizens or had been capa11. Determining what citizenship entails, and even asserting what citizenship is, is far more
difficult than Chief Justice Taney suggested. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 64-66 (discussing
difficulties in defining and explaining what citizenship entailed in the context of free black persons
before DredScott).
12. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406 ("It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in
the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by
them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.").
13. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the Constitution was formed for the benefit of the people
of the United States and their posterity).
14. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406 (limiting rights of U.S. citizenship "to embrace those
only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright
or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on
which it was founded").
15. See id. at 418 ("The Constitution upon its adoption obviously took from the States all power
by any subsequent legislation to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the United States any
one, no matter where he was born, or what might be his character or condition; and it gave to Congress
the power to confer this character upon those only who were bom outside of the dominions of the
United States. And no law of a State, therefore, passed since the Constitution was adopted, can give any
right of citizenship outside of its own territory.").
16. See id. at 405-06 (noting that a State can grant a person state citizenship with the result that
"so far as the State alone was concerned, [the person] would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a
citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State
attached to that character").
17. See id. at 405 ("Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal
Government...."); see also JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC 215-16 (2002) (discussing
the implications of not allowing free black persons to exercise the rights and immunities of citizens of
the U.S.).
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ble of becoming citizens at that time. If slaves or former slaves were eligible for citizenship at the Founding, Scott may have had a legitimate claim
that if he had become free, he had become a citizen of a state and of the
United States at the moment of his freedom. However, if slaves and former
slaves were not citizens-were not part of the sovereign people who
formed the people of the United States when the Constitution was ratified-then even if Scott had become free during his travels, he could not be
treated as a citizen of any state or as a citizen of the United States for the
purpose of suing under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court. Ultimately, Chief Justice Taney found that the whole Negro race had been so
poorly regarded at the time of the ratification of the Constitution that
none-free or slave-could have been citizens of the United States at that
time.
According to Taney, black persons simply had not been part of the
polity when the nation was founded and would not become so absent congressional action or constitutional amendment. 18 Taney's claim that black
persons had not been a part of the polity in the late 1700s meant that black
persons could not be a part of the polity in the mid- 1850s either. Basing his
analysis of black citizenship at the Founding on race and ancestry rather
than status, Taney merged race and slavery, asserting that all black persons
had come to America as slaves. 19 Consequently, all black people, whether
free or slave, were descendants of slaves and were in the same class of
people, for citizenship purposes, as slaves, and thus were unable to be or
20
become citizens of the United States.
The impossibility of black citizenship fit with Taney's view on how
citizens were made, i.e., by being descended from the group of state citi-

18. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 ("In the opinion of the court, the legislation and
histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the
class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free
or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument."). Justice Curtis, in dissent, argued that Taney was palpably wrong.
See id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those
States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on
equal terms with other citizens.").
19. See id. at 411 (opinion of the Court) ("No one of that race had ever migrated to the United
States voluntarily; all of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise.").
20. See id. at 403 ("It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose
ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves.
The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when
they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are
citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United
States.").
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zens who became U.S. citizens at the Founding, through birthright citizenship or through naturalization. Taney asserted that black persons were not
descended from the citizenship group, not surprisingly ignoring the special
case of mixed-race people. 2 1 Taney also noted that at least one state appeared to reject birthright citizenship for black people. 22 Lastly, Taney
noted that naturalization had never been used to make black people citi23
zens.
Taney's discussion suggested more than that no black persons had
been citizens at the time of the Founding through the 1850s. It suggested
that black persons-whether free or enslaved-were incapable of becoming citizens, a position not held with respect to other non-citizens. After
discussing statutes from various colonies suggesting the degradation suffered by black persons, Taney concluded not that the laws were unjust or
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or general notions of liberty, but
that the legal wall between black persons (including those of mixed race)
and white persons was so high and thick that it made no sense to think that
black persons were potential equals capable of citizenship at the time of the
Founding. 24 Indeed, Taney noted that Southern states never would have
ratified the Constitution had they believed that black persons could be citizens whose rights of citizenship would have to be protected as they traveled from state to state. 2 5 Taney appears to have been incorrect in
21. But see id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("And as free colored persons were then citizens of at
least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those
for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established.").
22. See id. at 415 (opinion of the Court) (noting a New Hampshire law restricting the militia to
free white persons and suggesting that even black people born in New Hampshire could not serve
because they made up no part of the people and had no duty to defend the state).
23. See id. at 418-20 (discussing the naturalization process and indicating that it had never covered black people). Of course, the naturalization power is left to Congress. See id. at 582 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting) ("The Constitution has left to the States the determination what persons, born within their
respective limits, shall acquire by birth citizenship of the United States; it has not left to them any
power to prescribe any rule for the removal of the disabilities of alienage. This power is exclusively in
Congress.").
24. See id. at 409 (opinion of the Court) ("[The laws cited] show that a perpetual and impassable
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so
far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or
mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but
in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the
free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the
whole race."). Although Taney also quotes statutes that would seem to put Indians in the same category
of degradation, see id. at 413-14, he treats Indians as a separate class of people who are capable of
citizenship. See id. at 403-04.
25. However, some Southern states may not have been as hostile to the possibility of black citizenship as Taney suggests. See id. at 573 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (discussing a North Carolina case
indicating that free black persons could become citizens of North Carolina and vote in North Carolina
before those rights were eventually eliminated by the North Carolina Constitution).
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identifying a specific monolithic view of black persons at the time of the
Founding. However, Taney's discussion of citizenship in general and black
citizenship in particular relates to the Dred Scott Court's acceptance of
26
tiered citizenship.
B.

Tiered Citizenship

Tiered citizenship results from the provision of different citizenship
rights to different groups of citizens. Citizenship rights are those rights that
are closely related to citizenship or are historically granted to citizens because of their status as citizens. Citizens who are provided all citizenship
rights are treated as first-tier citizens. Citizens who are not provided all
citizenship rights are treated as second-tier citizens or worse. Given that the
Dred Scott Court declined to treat black persons as citizens at all, the issue
of tiered citizenship does not flow directly from the Court's discussion of
black citizenship. However, the Court's discussion of citizenship in the
context of discussing black citizenship indicates that it embraced tiered
citizenship. For example, the Court noted that women are citizens, but defined citizenship rights and responsibilities in ways that allowed the possibility of second-tier citizenship for women.
Identifying rights of citizenship that are not being provided equally to
all citizens is the first step in identifying tiered citizenship. The most sensible way to identify a citizenship right is to take the definition of a citizen
and determine what rights have attached or should attach to that status. For
example, in defining those to be considered citizens at the time of the
Founding, Chief Justice Taney noted that citizens are part of the sovereign
people and are the ultimate holders of power-exercised through representatives-in a republic. Given that vision of citizenship, voting should be
considered a citizenship right and defending one's state or country should
be considered a right or duty of a citizen. 27 Indeed, both were analyzed as
possible citizenship rights by the Court. However, voting and defending
26. Eventually, the decision triggered a positive. See FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("Dred Scott
came to symbolize the high point of racism in American law, but it also helped lead to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been the fountainhead of racial equality in the twentieth century.").
27. Historically, some considered the right to hold office a citizenship right. See, e.g.,
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 64-65 (counting eligibility to hold office as a right that sometimes
went with the right to vote). However, some U.S. citizens are restricted from holding certain jobs, such
as President of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No person except a natural born
Citizen ... shall be eligible to the Office of President .... "). Determining what rights are citizenship
rights and what rights are super-citizenship rights can be difficult. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 48 (1998) (discussing rights historically held by all citizens
and rights held by "first-class" citizens).
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one's country were treated quite differently by the Dred Scott Court in the
course of assessing the possibility of black citizenship.
In discussing black citizenship, the Court noted that New Hampshire
did not allow black men, even those born in New Hampshire, to join the
militia. Given that defending one's state was considered a duty of the citizen, that black men were not allowed to defend their state suggested to
Taney that black persons were not considered citizens. 28 However, New
Hampshire treated white women citizens the same as black free men with
29
respect to militia service during the post-Constitution, pre-DredScott era.
That would suggest that women were not considered citizens either, though
30
the Dred Scott Court clearly noted that women were citizens.
Conversely, voting might appear to be even more tightly bound to
citizenship than being a part of the militia given that the citizenry was supposed to exercise its power through its elected representatives. However,
although Taney recognized the power of voting, he did not deem it to be a
right of citizenship to be exercised by all adult citizens. 3 1 Certainly, many
of that time conceived of the right to vote as a political right that could be
rationed, not a right of citizenship that had to be provided. 32 Of course,
Taney also had to deem the right to vote a non-citizenship right because the
right to vote both was restricted to men and had been given to black persons and other non-citizens in the country's history. 33 Rather than treat
28. See DredScott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 415.
29. See The Militia Law of the State of New Hampshire § 4 (Peirce & Gardner 1808) ("And be it
further enacted, That each and every free able bodied white male citizen of this State, resident therein,
who is or shall be of the age of sixteen years, and under the age of forty years, (except such as are
herein after excused,) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the Militia ... .
30. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422.
31. See id. ("Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who
form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is incapacitated from
holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and
when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the
necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens."). Even Justice Curtis, in
dissent, recognized that with respect to voting rights, some citizens could exercise the right and others
could not. See id. at 581 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (".... I do not think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential to citizenship, there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship
under the American Constitutions ... ").
32. Even Justice Curtis treated it in this way. See id. at 583 ("One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens; another may extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow all
persons above a prescribed age to convey property and transact business; another may exclude married
women. But whether native-born women, or persons under age, or under guardianship because insane
or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no one will
deny that they are citizens of the United States.").
33. See id. at 416 (opinion of the Court) ("[1]n no part of the country except Maine, did the African race, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political
rights."). But see id. at 575 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (noting that the constitutions of various states indicate
"that in some of the original thirteen States, free colored persons, before and at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were citizens of those States").
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voting as a citizenship right that had been unevenly granted, the Court declined to treat it as a citizenship right. Therefore, proof that black persons
had been given the right to vote in some states did not prove they were
34
citizens or capable of citizenship.
The Dred Scott Court notwithstanding, voting is an exercise so tied to
the notion of citizenship and belonging that it ought to have been deemed a
citizenship right that had often been provided in a discriminatory fashion
rather than a non-citizenship right.35 The restrictions on the right to vote
could be read, as Taney did, to suggest that the right to vote could not be a
citizenship right precisely because it had been denied to groups of people
who clearly were citizens. 36 A different analysis would suggest that the
right to vote was merely structured capriciously and treated improperly as a
privilege to be extended to some citizens and some non-citizens. However,
entrenchment of discrimination should not work a redefinition of a citizenship right. That is, a citizenship right should not cease to be a citizenship
right just because the government grants the right in a discriminatory fashion. This would lead to the oddly circular argument that the rights of citizenship are defined only as those given to all citizens by the government,
meaning that the restriction of a right would end its status as a right of citizenship. Based on this reasoning, it would be almost impossible to provide
a citizenship right in a discriminatory manner, as the citizenship right
37
would cease to be one once it was provided in a discriminatory manner.
Instead, it is more sensible to define what citizenship rights are in the abstract, then ask whether they have been provided in a discriminatory fashion. Citizens who are restricted from exercising rights of citizenship have
38
been treated as second-tier citizens.
If voting is considered a citizenship right that has been provided in an
uneven or discriminatory fashion, the Dred Scott Court's willingness to
34. See id. at 422 (opinion of the Court) ("So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of
the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union foreigners
not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but
that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States. And the provision in the
Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States, does not apply to them."). But see id. at
581 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (noting "the just and constitutional possession of this right [to vote] is decisive evidence of citizenship").
35. The history of the United States is filled with restrictions on the right to vote, including property qualifications, gender limitations, and racial restrictions. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional
Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 123 (2003).
36. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422.
37. The one exception might be a situation where a citizenship right was explicitly defined as a
citizenship right. The discriminatory provision of that right might not be deemed to change the character of the right.
38. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 48 (noting that "First-Class" citizens were considered able to
exercise political rights such as voting).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 82:209

allow second-tier citizenship becomes clear. With respect to women, voting
was a citizenship right that was not extended to them. In addition, voting
was a citizenship right that was extended to some non-citizens. Both facts
strengthen the case that the Court, with all of its Justices, accepted tiered
citizenship. Simply, the Dred Scott Court (taking the positions of all of the
Justices into account) suggested the existence of four groups: citizens who
could vote, citizens who could not vote, non-citizens who could vote, and
non-citizens who could not vote. Given this landscape, those adult citizens
who were not allowed to vote were a lesser form of citizen-a second-tier
citizen.
C.

Personhoodand Tiered Personhood

Not surprisingly, in the context of Dred Scott, tiered personhood is a
simpler issue to explain and understand than tiered citizenship. By positing
black people as true outsiders who were incapable of being or becoming a
part of the citizenry, the Dred Scott Court delineated a tier of personhood
for black people that was well below that of other non-citizens. All black
persons, whether free or enslaved, were considered inferior to everyone
else and were subject to being given fewer rights than others. 39 The Court's
argument was simple and simplistic. Because African slaves had been
treated as property when brought to the United States, the Negro race was a
40
degraded one whose degradation was passed on to each of its members.
Given that supposed history, free black people were to be treated as free
slaves rather than free people with slave ancestors. Indeed, Taney suggested that free black people were regulated more like slaves than like
41
other non-citizens.
Rather than treat all non-citizens alike, the opinion considered other
non-citizens living in the United States to be potential citizens-in-waiting
or simply citizens of other nations. 42 Particularly striking was how Taney
compared the state of black people to that of Indians, another historically
39. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05 ("[Tihey were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.").
40. See id. at 408 ("[A] negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property,
and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United States. The slaves were
more or less numerous in the different colonies, as slave labor was found more or less profitable. But no
one seems to have doubted the correctness of the prevailing opinion of the time.").
41. See id. at 421.
42. This reminds one of the notion that all U.S. territories were thought to be states-in-waiting
rather than permanent colonies or territories. See id. at 447.
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disfavored group. 43 Portrayed as noble savages, Indians were deemed a free
people who could become United States citizens if they left their tribes,
whereas black persons could never be citizens. 44 Taney failed to explain
fully why Indians were to be considered superior to black people given that
some of the statutes he cited as treating free black persons as akin to slaves
45
provided the same treatment for Indians.
That Taney's analysis was inconsistent is no surprise. However, it is
secondary to the broader concern that the opinion accepted and perpetuated
the notion of tiered personhood. Of that there is no doubt. The opinion
quite clearly distinguished between the relative position of black persons to
other non-citizens. Even casual observers of American history understand
this, as possibly the most famous sentence from Dred Scott rather starkly
illustrates the point:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that 46the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.

That describes tiered personhood. The Reconstruction Amendments
answered tiered personhood and tiered citizenship.
II.

THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

The Reconstruction Amendments were a collective, if somewhat incomplete, reply to the Dred Scott decision. The Thirteenth Amendment
banned slavery. 47 The Fourteenth Amendment made former slaves and
their progeny citizens. 48 The Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed that states

43. 1 use the term Indian because the opinion uses it. As importantly, calling Indians "Native
Americans" while discussing Dred Scott would be as ironic as calling black people "African Americans" in the same context.
44. Taney specifically distinguished Indians from black people, treating Indians as members of a
different nation akin to non-citizen foreigners. See id. at 403-04.
45. See, e.g., id. at 416 (citing law forbidding people from performing ceremonies intermarrying
white persons with Indians, black persons, or mulattoes),
46. Id. at 407.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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could not provide the right to vote in a racially discriminatory manner. 49
Though each of the Reconstruction Amendments served a specific purpose,
the amendments as a whole invited former (male) slaves and their progeny
into the polity as full participants, and created both a single class of citizens
and a single class of persons. 50 Though the Reconstruction Amendments
primarily affect states, they remind both state and federal governments that
government should treat all citizens equally with respect to certain rights
and should treat all people equally with respect to certain rights.
A.

Thirteenth Amendment

The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and other forms of involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, thus freeing former
slaves. The freedom the Thirteenth Amendment provided arguably should
have created a single class of citizens that included all those born in the
United States, including former slaves. 51 However, it did not, as freedom
did not necessarily guarantee equal rights and equal treatment. That the
Thirteenth Amendment did not make citizens out of former slaves was not
surprising given that the Dred Scott decision had noted that free black people were not citizens. Rather than grant citizenship to newly-freed former
slaves, the Thirteenth Amendment arguably merely elevated former slaves
to the level of free black persons.52 More would be required to provide
citizenship and equality to former slaves and it came in the form of the
53
Fourteenth Amendment.

49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
50. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1400; Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1398-99
(2005) ("The Reconstruction Era amendments ... were intended to constitutionalize the package of
rights necessary to expand the national community to include formerly enslaved African Americans and
facilitate their equal membership in that community.").
51. See Chambers, Colorblindness,supra note 4, at 1401-04.
52. See Garrett Epps, The Undiscovered Country: Northern Views of the Defeated South and the
Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 411, 422
(2004) ("Southerners 'accepted' that Lincoln had freed the slaves-at least for the time being-but
mere legal freedom did not make them citizens, it made them 'free blacks,' a tightly restricted legal
status that had existed before the Civil War.").
53. Of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an attempt to secure some of the rights the Thirteenth Amendment was to provide or protect by virtue of abolishing slavery, but which Southern states
had declined to provide or affirmatively infringed. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 162.
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B.

Fourteenth Amendment

In direct response to the Dred Scott decision, the Fourteenth Amendment provided citizenship to former slaves and their progeny. 54 In addition
to making former slaves citizens, the Amendment required that all citizens
be provided citizenship rights on equal grounds. Though states were not
allowed to pick and choose the citizens who would enjoy the rights of citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural equality provision did not
dictate the substantive rights that states had to provide to citizens. 55 Rather,
it regulated how the rights that states granted to citizens were to be distributed. Nonetheless, the amendment implicitly created a single class of citizen by demanding that whatever citizenship rights are provided to some
citizens must be provided to all citizens.
By declining to define or name any rights of citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment provided states with the latitude to continue to define
important rights, such as voting, as something other than citizenship rights,
i.e., rights that had to be provided equally to all citizens. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment, as originally written, appeared to allow states to decline to provide a right to vote to black male citizens on the basis of their
race, if those states were willing to lose some proportional amount of congressional representation. 56 Of course, if one presumed that no state was
willing to pay for its voting restriction by losing congressional seats, the
Fourteenth Amendment indirectly protected a right to vote. Nonetheless,
how voting rights were treated illuminates the fact that, at the time of its
passage, the Fourteenth Amendment demanded equality only with respect
to a narrow set of rights defined as legal and civil rights, not wholesale
equality with respect to social and political rights. 57 This does not suggest
that Dred Scott was anything other than odious, just that the Fourteenth

54. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); AMAR, supra note 27, at 170-71.
55. See Chambers, Colorblindness,supra note 4, at 1406 n.33.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.").
57. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36; Chambers, Colorblindness,supra note 4,
at 1416 & n.75.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 82:209

Amendment imperfectly defined and protected some rights, such as voting
rights, that should have been considered rights of citizenship. 58
In addition to providing equal rights for citizens, the Fourteenth
Amendment provided a basic level of rights to all persons, whether citizens
or not, under the United States' jurisdiction. All persons were to enjoy due
process rights with respect to their rights to life, liberty, and property, as
well as equal protection rights. These protections created a single class of
personhood with respect to a basic level of rights. The Fourteenth Amendment's explicit recognition that citizens must be treated as equals with respect to citizenship rights and that persons must be treated as equals with
respect to rights of personhood was an implicit rejection of the tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood that the Dred Scott Court accepted.
C. Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment completed the task of formally integrating
former male slaves into the polity by guaranteeing that the right to vote
would not be abridged on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Fifteenth Amendment provided protection for the right to
vote that buttressed the protection the Fourteenth Amendment provided
indirectly. However, that protection was provided in a procedural manner
reminiscent of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of rights. Rather
than provide the right to vote, the Fifteenth Amendment required that
whatever right to vote the state grants must be provided in a racially nondiscriminatory manner. 5 9 This distinction between providing a right to vote
and protecting voting from discriminatory distribution arguably no longer
matters as the Fourteenth Amendment now treats voting essentially as a
fundamental right.60 However, at the time, the Fifteenth Amendment protected the right to vote of former slaves as powerfully as could be expected
and indicated a desire to treat former slaves as full members of society. In
addition, it suggested that the right to vote was tied more closely to citizenship than the Dred Scott decision suggested.
58. The Fourteenth Amendment's treatment of voting suggests the dual nature of the right to vote
as both a political and citizenship right. How voting was addressed arguably suggests that voting was
not a citizenship right covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the fact that voting was specifically mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that voting is intimately related to citizenship or representation, the means through which Chief Justice Taney suggested that citizens exercised
power in a republic.
59. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1419 ("To be clear, the Fifteenth Amendment
does not provide the right to vote; it limits how the right to vote generally provided by the state government may be restricted." (footnotes omitted)).
60. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
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D.

Government Prerogative

The Reconstruction Amendments provide a different way of structuring governmental prerogative. Rather than accept governmental prerogative
that allows governments to choose favorites among groups of citizens or
groups of people, thereby creating tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood, the Reconstruction Amendments demand equality with respect to
rights. Certainly, occasions may arise when citizens have not yet gained
some rights of citizenship or when they lose some rights of citizenship.
However, the differential provision of rights must be based on some justification, not governmental fiat that categorizes certain groups of citizens as
second-tier citizens and categorizes groups of persons as unworthy of the
most basic rights of personhood.
III. TIERS AND JUSTIFIED RIGHTS RESTRICTION
The Reconstruction Amendments write equality into the fabric of the
Constitution and eliminate tiered citizenship and tiered personhood by requiring the provision of equal rights under most circumstances. However,
tiered citizenship or tiered personhood does not result every time a right is
withheld or affirmatively taken away from certain citizens, persons, or
groups of citizens or persons. Citizenship rights and personhood rights may
be restricted or taken away from citizens and people consistent with the
spirit of a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood when the
restriction of the right is actually justified. Conversely, if the restriction of
the right is merely explained, but not actually justified, a de facto tier may
have been created.
A.

Justifying the Restriction of Rights

Though rights are supposed to be enjoyed by all under most circumstances, they must be restricted on some occasions. A justified restriction of
rights does not create the specter of tiering; an unjustified restriction of
rights does create the specter of tiering. Though determining whether a
restriction of rights is justified is difficult, justifying a restriction of rights is
critically important in determining whether the restriction represents a principled limitation on the exercise of rights or merely reflects a government's
choice to favor or disfavor a citizen vis-A-vis other citizens. This essay will
not attempt to assess whether any particular restriction of rights is or is not
justified. Rather, it merely highlights the need to justify restrictions on
rights lest those restrictions appear to flow from a Dred Scott mindset that
embraces unjustified differential treatment.
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Justifying a restriction of rights is a two-step process. The first step
requires determining why the right at issue exists. For example, in determining whether a restriction of a state-based right to bear arms is justified,
one would need to determine precisely why the right to bear arms was provided by the state. 6 1 The difficulty in'determining the answer comes from
the need to answer the question in the abstract, without reference to how
the right has been shaped by the very limitation one seeks to justify. That
is, if one defines the scope of the right to bear arms solely based on the
manner in which the right has been restricted, the restriction becomes a
description of the contours of the right rather than a justification for the
restriction of the right.
The second step requires comparing the basis for the restriction to the
purpose of the right restricted. Relevant questions include the following: Is
this restriction of the right necessary to preserve the value of the right for
others? Would continued use of the right by the restricted person harm the
exercise of the right by all others? Has the restricted person demonstrated
an inability to use the restricted right properly? These questions help determine whether there is a relationship between the basis of the restriction
and the right itself. If there is little or no relationship between the right's
utilization and the restriction of the right, the restriction may be an exercise
of the raw power to restrict rights rather than a justification for the restriction of the right.
The analysis must occur against the backdrop of the fact that the right
in question is generally given to all citizens or all people. Consequently, the
right should or must be provided unless there is a true justification for restricting it. Some might suggest that justification is merely a substitute for
strict scrutiny; it is not. 62 Certainly, the concepts are related, but the tiers of
scrutiny in constitutional law are structured differently. This is not surprising, as the tiers of scrutiny aim to determine whether a law or action is
constitutional. Consequently, the tiers of scrutiny merely require that
governmental restrictions that appear more troubling under the Constitution
be more convincingly explained than governmental restrictions that appear
less troubling under the Constitution. 63 Conversely, the concept ofjustifica-

61. This question is difficult enough to answer at the federal level. Scholars have been debating
the issue for years. See Symposium, The Second Amendement: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1
(2000). Answering the question at the state level may be even more difficult depending on the process
by which the right was generated at the state level.
62. See Chambers, Retooling, supra note 4, at 613 (noting the content of the strict scrutiny test).
63. See id. at 612-13 & nn.7-14 (noting that the strength of the explanation necessary to deem a
governmental action constitutional is lowest under the rational basis test applied to state action with
modest equal protection implications, and highest under the strict scrutiny test applied to state action
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tion suggested in this essay is structured on determining whether there is a
real relationship between the restriction and the right itself. The concept of
justification aims to determine if citizens are being treated as second-tier
citizens as a way to identify Dred Scott-style thinking. The question remains, have tiered citizenship and tiered personhood been successfully
abolished by the Reconstruction Amendments?
B.

Tiered Citizenship and Felon Disfranchisement

Tiered citizenship entails the denial of a right of citizenship to a citizen or some group of citizens without justification. Regardless of how it
may have been viewed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, voting is now considered a fundamental right of citizenship, the abridgment of
which must withstand exacting scrutiny. 64 If the denial of the right to vote
is actually justified, such denial does not trigger concerns of second-tier
citizenship whether its denial passes the required constitutional scrutiny or
not. Conversely, if the denial of rights is not actually justified, it triggers
second-tier citizenship concerns whether it passes the required constitutional scrutiny or not. Just such an issue arises with felon disfranchisement.
Felon disfranchisement may take a number of forms, but eventually
yields a felon-citizen who cannot vote. Felon disfranchisement has not
always been strict and arguably did not flower fully until after the Reconstruction Amendments required that black men be provided the right to
vote. 6 5 Consequently, felon disfranchisement has been more of a process of
picking and choosing ways to restrict voting rights rather than a universal
command suggesting that felonious behavior should always trigger the loss
of the franchise. 66 This should trigger tiered citizenship concerns. In determining whether felon disfranchisement is justified, the question becomes,
is a restriction on the right to vote related to a prior felony conviction?

with crucial equal protection implications, such as those creating racial classifications or affecting
fundamental rights).
64. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
65. Indeed, some of the disfranchisement laws of the post-Reconstruction era were aimed specifically at disfranchising black citizens. See Gabriel J. Chin, The "Voting Rights Act of 1867": The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1608
(2004); see also Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulationand the "Menace of Negro Domination ": Racial Threat and Felon Disfranchisement in the United States, 18502002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559 (2003) (discussing links between racial composition of prison populations
and adoption of felon disfranchisement laws).
66. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement,and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004)
(discussing Mississippi's choice of crimes to which felon disfranchisement would apply based on
beliefs regarding the characteristics of crimes that black people would commit).
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One claimed justification for restricting felon voting rights has been
that such restrictions have always been allowed and still appear to be allowed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 At least two responses exist.
First, though the Fourteenth Amendment appears to contemplate or allow
felon disfranchisement, it may do so based on the belief prevailing at the
time of the amendment's passage that voting was not a fundamental right.
Now that voting is treated as a fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment arguably protects the distribution of the right to all citizens. 68 Second,
that felon disfranchisement may be facially constitutional does not actually
justify the practice. If the practice is not consistent with democracy and the
notion of a single tier of citizenship, it is problematic. The text of the Constitution arguably afforded the Dred Scott majority the latitude to write the
opinion it wrote. However, the substance of the opinion still created a
tiered citizenship. Indeed, the Dred Scott Court made clear that the Constitution allowed the tiered citizenship of women. 69 The allowance of a second tier of citizenship hardly made such treatment appropriate, it just made
it constitutional at the time. Of course, the second tier of citizenship for
women was not justified; it was simply explained, asserted, and allowed.
Allowing felon disfranchisement to be merely explained, asserted, and
allowed would likewise be problematic.
Felon disfranchisement is practiced differently throughout the United
States with some states having an almost total ban on voting by those who
have been convicted of certain felonies, others allowing felons to vote after
they have completed various parts of their sentences, and yet others having
no felony-based restrictions at all. 70 That states apply a patchwork of felon
disfranchisement laws does not necessarily mean that felon disfranchisement is not justified or justifiable. 7 1 However, it suggests that different
67. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Chambers, Colorblindness,supra note 4, at
1436 n.163.
68. See Chambers, Colorblindness,supra note 4, at 1425 n. 116.
69. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1857).
70. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (providing state-by-state felon
disfranchisement laws); Right to Vote: Campaign to End Felony Disfranchisement,
http://www.righttovote.org/state.asp (last visited Sep. 7, 2006) (same). Of course, disfranchisement has
been a punishment for bad behavior, such as taking up arms against one's country. However, voting
rights were restored to most Confederates fairly soon after the Civil War. See General Amnesty Act, ch.
193, 17 Stat. 142 (1872); Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death ":The Ideological Paradox of CriminalDisenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1104-05.
71. However, wide differences in the severity of felon disfranchisement laws suggest that continuing to disfranchise felons after they are no longer under the supervision of the criminal justice system
does not reflect a nationwide consensus. The lack of consensus on whether the right to vote must be
denied to felons suggests that there may not be a justification for the lifetime bans on felon voting that
some states have. Indeed, many scholars have questioned the justifications generally provided for felon
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states may have quite different reasons for their felon disfranchisement
laws. Some of those reasons may be true justifications while others may
merely be explanations for treating felons poorly. For example, a state that
views the right to vote as a core citizenship right but which bans felons
from voting because the state believes that withholding a core right is fair
punishment for a felony may have an explanation for their felon disfranchisement law, but may not have a justification for it.
However, the power to restrict felons in some ways does not automatically justify the restriction of felons with respect to citizenship rights.
A justification would come in the form of an argument that the felony conviction that triggered the disfranchisement suggests that the felon should
not be allowed to exercise the franchise in order to protect the right to vote
for those who can properly exercise it. If felon disfranchisement is fully
justified in all states that practice it in whatever form the states practice it,
concerns regarding tiered citizenship vanish. However, in the absence of a
justification for felon disfranchisement, the restriction of voting rights simply helps to create a second-tier citizenship for felons. Some may desire
just such a second-tier citizenship for felons. However, this recalls the
thinking underlying Dred Scott.
C.

Tiered Personhoodand War on TerrorDetainees

The tiered personhood issue has two components. The first component
focuses on guaranteeing that all persons are given the same set of rights
that other persons receive. The second component focuses on ensuring that
no set of persons is given a set of rights below the minimum rights guaranteed to all persons in all circumstances. 72 Our country's commitment to
both of these principles is being tested with respect to how we treat detainees in the War on Terror (WOT). 7 3 Two questions arise. First, under what
circumstances are WOT detainees being given fewer rights than non-WOT

disfranchisement. See KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 41-45

(2005) (discussing scholarly critique of felony disfranchisement). See generally JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN,

LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(2006); Ewald, supra note 70.
72. Certainly, actions, such as criminal action, can trigger the loss of rights. However, all elements
of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). Nonetheless, once the proof has been provided, the loss of liberty or life can occur. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (discussing the application of the death penalty, but not questioning its

general legality).
73. Of course, War on Terror detainees are not the only non-citizens who may have to worry
about second-tier personhood in the post-9/1 I world. See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,
"Aliens " in Our Midst Post-9/lJ: LegislatingOutsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1683 (2005) (book review).
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detainees? Second, under what circumstances, if any, are WOT detainees
being provided fewer rights than all persons are to be provided under the
Constitution under all circumstances? Depending on the answers to these
questions, the government may be in the process of creating a different tier
of personhood for WOT detainees.
The question regarding second-tier personhood must be asked in part
because it appears that WOT detainees are provided fewer rights than nonWOT detainees.7 4 For example, WOT detainees appear to receive less access to counsel and the courts than other detainees receive. 75 Similarly,
WOT detainees appear to receive harsher physical treatment than other
detainees receive. 76 In addition, WOT detainees appear to have been subject to the possibility of extraordinary rendition-a practice in which the
U.S. delivers a detainee to another country that has fewer concerns about
using certain particularly stressful interrogation techniques than the U.S.
does-whereas other detainees are not. 77 If there is legitimate justification
for this differential treatment, there is no second-tier personhood problem;
if there is no legitimate justification for such treatment, the WOT detainees
arguably are being treated as second-tier persons.
The implications flowing from the treatment of WOT detainees is particularly interesting in that the law relating to that issue is somewhat in
flux. 78 Certainly, some of the laws and practices that govern detainee

74. See Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (reporting on interrogation
techniques that had been authorized specifically for War on Terror detainees).
75. Congress has stripped statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction from the federal courts in many
War on Terror detainee cases. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)
(West Supp. 2006); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & KENNETH THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT 11 (2005), available at

http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33180_20051207.pdf, Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The
Law of InternationalDetainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 748-52 (2006) (discussing the
stripping of habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005).
76. Claims of torture or other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of War on Terror detainees
exist. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 75, at 696; Mayer, supra note 74, at 34, 37 (discussing brutal
treatment of detainee Mohammed al-Qahtani). The recently passed Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
outlaws cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of persons under custody or control of the United States
government and defines such treatment to include any treatment barred by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000dd (West Supp. 2006). What effect it may have is unclear.
77. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the case of a Canadian-Syrian citizen who was rendered through Jordan to Syria, where he was tortured); Chesney, supra
note 75, at 665-69 (discussing rendition and the law of detainee transfer when there is risk of torture
from receiving country).
78. This is not to say that there are no laws on the issue, just that what law the United States will
follow when analyzing specific questions regarding the treatment of WOT detainees is somewhat
unclear. Unfortunately, even the Government's most recent attempt to clarify issues, The Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of
10 U.S.C.), may fail to do so.
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treatment may allow WOT detainees to be treated differently than other
detainees of the U.S. government, such as unremarkable violators of federal
law. Differential treatment that comports with the law obviously would be
legal. However, the differential treatment, even if it comports with the law,
must be justified if it is to avoid the creation of second-tier personhood.
Without justification, those laws are simply the vehicles used to treat WOT
detainees as second-tier persons. Indeed, vigilance may be particularly
necessary in areas where the relevant written law allows for differential
treatment. The existence of statutes allowing differential treatment may
cause many to be complacent about the possibility of seemingly legal, second-tier treatment. In addition, vigilance may be particularly necessary in
circumstances where some forms of differential treatment may have little,
79
if any, opportunity to be addressed through the courts.
However, most important in considering the treatment of WOT detainees may be the fact that President George W. Bush has suggested that
he may exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers independent of the written law. 80 Asserting this power literally gives the President the power to
pick and choose who will be treated poorly and who will be treated well.
With this power comes the obligation to justify the choices, at least in a
broad sense. Given the possibility of the use of presidential fiat, it is particularly important to develop and consider possible justifications that
could support allowing the President to provide fewer rights or poorer
treatment to WOT detainees than to other detainees in U.S. custody. This is
not an argument against the exercise of extraordinary Commander-in-Chief
powers. It is a recognition that even if the Commander-in-Chief's power in
fact supersedes the written law in certain circumstances, not only must the
required circumstances that would trigger the use of the extraordinary
power actually exist, but the exercise of the power still should be analyzed
to determine if it would create second-tier personhood for the WOT detain-

79. See Josh White & Carol D. Leonnig, U.S. Cites Exception in Torture Ban, WASH. POST, Mar.
3, 2006, at A4 (noting that the Bush administration has argued that "the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, removes general access to U.S. courts for all Guantanamo Bay captives"). Even after the passage
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, it is unclear precisely how much practical access the WOT
detainees will have to federal courts.
80. See George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006,
41
WKLY.
COMP.
PRES.
Docs.
1918,
1919
(2005),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html
("The executive branch shall
construe Title X in Division A of the Act [also called the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005], relating to
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the
unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations
on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.").
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ees. The justification for whatever treatment a President may allow would
determine whether the treatment created a second tier of personhood for
any particular WOT detainee or WOT detainees as a class.
For example, assume that the United States government contemplated
engaging in the practice of extraordinary rendition. Depending on the circumstances, the procedure may be legal under our written law, or, even if it
is not explicitly legal, it may be acceptable under law if the President is
legally allowed to exercise the Commander-in-Chief powers he claims to
possess. 8 1 Certainly, the law itself and the President will rely on reasons for
allowing or ordering the extraordinary rendition. However, the issue is
whether the reason is merely an explanation for the extraordinary rendition
or an actual justification. An actual justification for the rendition decision
might make the decision an appropriate one under Reconstruction Amendments (specifically Fourteenth Amendment) principles; a mere explanation
for the decision would make the decision an acceptable one under Dred
Scott's principles.
A recitation of reasons does not equal justification. The Dred Scott
Court merely recited the facts that free black persons and slaves were
treated badly under the laws of various states and allowed the inhuman
treatment of slaves and free black persons to continue, making them second-tier persons. The Court's allowance of such poor treatment did not
justify it; the allowance merely made it constitutional at the time. Detainees
in the WOT may deserve different treatment that non-WOT detainees and
may deserve treatment previously thought to be less generous than all persons deserve. As long as such treatment is actually justified, it does not
trigger second-tier personhood concerns. With justification, the treatment
becomes a legitimate manner of distinguishing those who can be treated
particularly harshly because of what they have done from those who cannot
be treated so harshly. Without justification, the treatment is the mechanism
for removing the personhood status of the WOT detainees. If that is what is
to be done, it should be done in clear recognition that similar treatment has
been allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court, but has been rejected by the people through the spirit of the Reconstruction Amendments.

81. Some believe that the Commander-in-Chief powers are quite broad. See Daniel Levin, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (superseding previous August 1, 2002 memo
opining on very broad Commander-in-Chief power, but not contradicting the analysis on that issue); Jay
S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ dojinterrogationmemo2002O8Ol .pdf (arguing for extremely broad vision of Commander-in-Chief power).
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As with the discussion of felon disfranchisement, the point of this essay is not to argue for or against the existence of a justification or lack
thereof for the treatment of War on Terror detainees. The point is to provide the ground rules for the discussion of whether restrictions on personhood rights are justified or unjustified for purposes of deciding whether
multiple tiers of personhood or citizenship have been created. Indeed, if
this essay spurs people merely to think about the notion and necessity of
justifying governmental action as required by fealty to the spirit of the Reconstruction Amendments, it will have served an important purpose.
CONCLUSION

The Dred Scott Court allowed tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood to exist, with various groups of citizens favored over others and various groups of persons favored over others. Simply, that Court allowed
governments to pick and choose who was allowed to exercise citizenship
rights and rights of personhood with little or any justification for the
choices. 82 Some may argue that Dred Scott was a sign of the times, and
indeed it was. In response, the Reconstruction Amendments were passed to
write into the law a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood. Nonetheless, the danger of creating tiers of citizenship and tiers of
personhood is ever present.
Concerns about tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood do not
mean that individual citizens and persons, or even groups of them, will
never forfeit rights. Certainly, there are and will be occasions when specific
citizens or groups of citizens will lose some rights of citizenship without
tiers of citizenship being created, and some persons or groups of persons
will lose some rights generally enjoyed by all persons without tiers of personhood being created. However, why the citizen is denied the citizenship
right or why the person is denied the personhood right is critical. If the
denial of rights is actually justified, the denial does not create second-tier
citizenship or personhood, but instead creates a legitimate limitation on the
exercise of the citizenship or personhood right. However, the mere adher82. This is not to say that the Dred Scott Court gave governments complete discretion to select
winners and losers. Chief Justice Taney vigorously protected the rights of some citizens against government intrusion using the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) ("Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person,
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed
no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.").
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ence to written law in taking such rights does not indicate adequate justification, as the written law itself may not provide actual justification for the
denial of rights. If the denial of the right is not actually justified, the reason
given for the denial is merely an explanation or excuse to deny a right of
citizenship to a citizen or a right of personhood to a person. An unjustified
denial of such rights can create tiers of citizenship and personhood.
It would be easy to argue that we are in a post-Dred Scott world in
which tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood have been abolished.
Though we are in a post-Dred Scott world, we must always be vigilant that
we think with a post-Dred Scott mindset. Dred Scott afforded and blessed a
world in which different sets of citizens were provided different sets of
rights for no good reason, and different groups of people were provided
different sets of rights for no good reason. The temptation to follow the
same path exists today, even in our post-Dred Scott world. Rather than
adhere to the requirement that a single class of citizen be allowed to exercise all rights of citizenship and that a single class of person be treated with
basic dignity, governments may explain differential treatment of groups of
citizens or persons with rationalizations rather than real justifications for
such treatment. Vigilance and reason are necessary to ensure that the temptation to treat groups of people in unjustifiable manners does not overwhelm us and the constitutional amendments our country put in place to
squelch such temptation. It will take continued vigilance to keep Dred
83
Scott-era thinking out of our post-DredScott world.

83. A commitment to an inclusive America may require rethinking the basket of rights that all
Americans and all persons in the United States are supposed to share. See generally Morgan & Zietlow,
supra note 50.

